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Hold All Arbitrations: Public Policy
Invalidations are on the Loose!
Town of Groton v. United Steelworkers of America'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has held that arbitration awards derived from
collective bargaining agreements may be invalidated based on public policy.
However, an arbitration award should only be invalidated if the public policy is
explicit, well-defined, and dominant.' This article will examine how the Connecticut
Supreme Court applied the public policy test and whether the court adequately
justified its decision.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
David Warren worked at the town of Groton landfill as a weighmaster.3 His
duties included taking money for the town and giving Groton residents permits to
dump their waste.4 The waste permit fees were to be turned over to the appropriate
officials of Groton.5 The Groton Police Department suspected Warren of keeping
the permit money, and they charged him with two counts of larceny by
embezzlement in the sixth degree and one count of violating a town ordinance.6 The
charges were filed on November 20, 1996, and Warren's supervisor was informed
of his arrest on November 22, 1996.7 Warren was temporarily transferred to the
highway department and notified that possible disciplinary action, including
termination, may be taken after the court action was finalized.'
On December 4, 1996, Warren plead nolo contendere on one count of larceny
and the prosecutor dismissed the other charge of larceny and the town ordinance
violation.9 Warren asserted that his financial situation forced him to plead nolo
contendere.'°
After numerous meetings between Warren, his supervisor, and the union
representative, Warren was terminated on April 14, 1997.1 On Warren's behalf,
United Steelworkers of America ("Steelworkers") filed a grievance which was
denied. 2 Groton and Steelworkers disagreed about what standard to apply to
1. 757 A.2d 501 (Conn. 2000). This is a rehearing of a case from a decision of less than a year ago,
Town of Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 747 A.2d 1045 (Conn. 2000).
2. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, nt Il. Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers ofAmerica, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).






9. Id. at 504-05.
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Warren's termination. 3 Groton contended that Warren's plea of nolo contendere
was equivalent to a conviction and grounds for termination under Groton's Personnel
Rule 10, section 1(a) which states: "Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor arising
out of the performance of duty or within the scope of employment which may affect
the performance of duty." 4 Steelworkers, on the other hand, contended that Groton
should have used subsection (h) of the same rule which implies that Groton needs
to conduct its own investigation before terminating Warren. 5 A collective
bargaining agreement between Groton and Steelworkers called for arbitration of
grievances concerning unjustified termination.' 6 Therefore, the matter went to
arbitration. 7
The arbitrator decided that Groton did not have just cause to terminate Warren. 8
The arbitrator asserted the termination would have been valid if Groton had done its
own investigation.' 9 The arbitrator ordered Groton to rehire Warren.20 Groton
asked the trial court to vacate the award, and Steelworkers asked the trial court to
confirm the award.2' The trial court vacated the award based on Groton's argument
that the arbitration order violated public policy.22 The appeal reached the
Connecticut Supreme Court.23
The Connecticut Supreme Court held there is a clear public policy against
embezzlement and an employer does not have to follow an arbitration order to
reinstate an employee who has been found guilty or pleaded nolo contendere to
embezzlement.24
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. United States Supreme Court
The Connecticut Supreme Court looked at WR. Grace & Co. v. Rubber
Workers25 and United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.2 6 for
guidance. W.R. Grace provides the basic rule for vacating an arbitration award
concerning collective bargaining agreements. Misco gives the minimum standard
to vacate such an arbitration award.
In W.R. Grace, W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace") and Local Union No. 759
("Union") were engaged in a collective bargaining agreement that expired in March
of 1974.27 After a long investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity
13. Id. at 506.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 505.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 507.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 501.
24. Id. at 509.
25. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
26. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
27. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 759.
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Commission ("EEOC") decided that Grace violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by discriminating in the hiring of women and African-Americans.28
In May, Grace and Union worked out a new collective bargaining agreement.29
Grace allegedly violated the new collective bargaining agreement, and Union sought
to arbitrate. a
Grace and the EEOC reached a conciliation agreement on December 11, 1974.3
Grace then attempted to use the conciliation agreement with the EEOC to get a
summary judgement against the Union to negate the parts of the collective
bargaining agreement that conflicted with the conciliation agreement.32
While the case was being considered, Grace terminated employees per the
conciliation agreement.33 The district court held for Grace and the EEOC, allowing
for modification of the collective bargaining agreement.34 The Union appealed.3
During the appeal, Grace terminated more men with seniority per the conciliation
agreement.36
In January 1978, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision and ordered Grace to arbitrate with Union.3 7 The first arbitrator, Sabella,
declared that even though Union could get an award, it should not because Grace had
been complying with an outstanding court order.38 Union decided to contest
Sabella's ruling through more arbitration.39
The second arbitrator, Barrett, decided that he did not have to conform to
Sabella's arbitration award and that there was no good faith violation exception to
the seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.40 Therefore, it was
Grace's risk when it violated the collective bargaining agreement to follow the
conflicting conciliation agreement.4
Grace appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi.42  The district court held that public policy should prevent the
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement during the appeal.43 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.44
The Court ruled that in order to vacate an arbitration award on grounds of public
policy, the policy must be explicit, well defined, dominant and found by looking at
28. W.R. Grace& Co., 461 U.S. at 759. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1994).




33. Id. at 761.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 761-62.
37. Id. at 762.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 763.
41. Id.
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the laws and precedents, not generalities of alleged public interests.4 5 The Court
looked at several possible public policy reasons 46 to side with Grace, but found
none.47 The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals.48
In Misco, the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement with the United
Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO, and the local union
("Paperworkers"). 49  This agreement held that grievances between Misco and
Paperworkers as to the application or interpretation of the agreement would be
arbitrated.50
Isiah Cooper, an employee of Misco and a union member, was discharged when
Misco found out that Cooper had been arrested for marijuana possession.5 Cooper
filed a grievance against his discharge.52 The arbitrator ordered Misco to reinstate
Cooper because there was no just cause in terminating Cooper.53 Misco filed in the
district court to vacate the award. 4
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana agreed
with Misco that to reinstate Cooper was against public policy of general safety
concerns arising from operating dangerous machinery while under the influence of
narcotics.55 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.56 The United States
Supreme Court granted Paperworker's writ of certiorari petition and reversed the
court of appeals.57
The Court held that to uphold an award vacated based on public policy, at the
very minimum, the supposed public policy must be properly framed to create an
explicit conflict with laws and precedent and the violation of the policy must be
clearly shown to vacate the award.58 The court of appeals did not satisfy this
minimum, therefore the arbitration award was reinstated.59
Therefore, the Court ruled that in order to vacate an arbitration award based on
public policy, the public policy must be explicit, well defined, present in the law
through precedent, and that the enforcement of the arbitration award would create
an explicit conflict with laws and precedent.
45. Id. at 766.
46. First, the public policy of obeying judicial orders was not harmed because Grace did not violate
the court order and court contempt powers are sufficient for protection. Id. at 768. Second, the public
policy of Title VII voluntary compliance is outweighed here by a third party's (Union is a third party to
the conciliation agreement of Grace and EEOC) reliance that a company will honor the collective
bargaining agreement between themselves and the company. Id. at 770-71.
47. Id. at 766-72.
48. Id. at 772.
49. Misco, 484 U.S. at 31.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 34.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 34-35.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 42-45.
59. Id. at 44.
[Vol. 200 1, No. 2
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The Connecticut Supreme Court then used its own jurisprudence to show that
arbitration awards contrary to public policy are not upheld by the court. The court
used Board of Trustees for State Tech. Colleges v. Federation of Technical College
Teachers' and City ofStamford v. Stamford Police Association61 to demonstrate this.
The court further used Board of Trustees to state that the question is not whether the
arbitrator was right, rather whether enforcement of the award is proper.
In BoardofTrustees, the Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 1942,
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO ("AFT") and the Board of Trustees for
State Technical Colleges ("Board") entered into a collective bargaining agreement
on April 15, 1977.62 Union argued that the agreement contained a provision that
gave full-time faculty fifteen days of sick leave a year.63 However, this portion of
the agreement was not properly submitted to the Connecticut General Assembly for
its approval.64 Therefore, Board contended that full-time faculty were only allowed
twelve and one-half days of sick leave a year.65 The parties agreed to arbitration of
the disagreement under the collective bargaining agreement. 66 The arbitrator
declared that under the collective bargaining agreement, full-time faculty was
entitled to fifteen days of sick leave per year.67
The Board appealed to the court to vacate the award. 6 The trial court ruled that
the award conflicted with state statutes and regulations that set the full-time faculty
sick leave at twelve and one-half days per year.69 AFT appealed. 70 The court held,
"just as private parties cannot expect a court to enforce a contract between them to
engage in conduct which is illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy, they cannot
expect an intervening arbitral award approving (or ordering) that conduct to receive
judicial endorsement."'', The court further stated that in cases where the award
conflicts with public policy, it is not concerned with whether the arbitrator's decision
was correct; rather it is concerned about whether enforcing the award would be
legal.72 The court found that the arbitrator's award was in conflict with Connecticut
state law.73 Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's vacation of the award.74
60. 425 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Conn. 1979).
61. 540 A.2d 400 (Conn. App. 1988). In dicta, this case supports the proposition that arbitration
awards contrary to public policy are not upheld.
62. Board of Trustees, 425 A.2d at 1248.
63. Id. at 1248-49.
64. 1d. at 1249.
65. Id. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-329(a), 5-247(a) (1996); Conn. Regs. §§ 5-247-1, 5-247-2(a)
(1996).





71. Id. at 1252 (quoting Robert A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization, and Collective
Bargaining 593 (West Publg. Co. 1976)).
72. Id. at 1253.
73. Id.
74. 1d. at 1254.
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In Stamford, Robert Esposito, a Stamford police officer, was terminated from
his sick leave because there was little chance that he would recover from his illness
(the officer was blind)." Esposito and the Stamford Police Association filed a
grievance to the state board of mediation and arbitration ("state board") claiming that
there was no provision for termination of an officer on extended sick leave within
the collective bargaining agreement between the Stamford Police Association and
Stamford.76 The state board reinstated Esposito's sick leave status, and ruled the
Stamford Police Association claim was valid." Stamford brought an action in trial
court to vacate the arbitration ruling, claiming that it violated public policy in that
it prevented Stamford from hiring a new police officer in Esposito's place in order
to foster public safety. 7 The trial court declared that giving Esposito back his status
did not place enough burden on the public policy of providing public safety to vacate
the arbitration award.79 Stamford appealed. 0 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that the reinstating of Esposito's sick leave status did not affect the public
policy of public safety enough to invalidate the award.8"
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the arbitrator could not force Groton
to reinstate Warren." The court used Stamford and Board of Trustees for the
proposition that an arbitration award that is illegal or contrary to public policy cannot
be expected to be endorsed by the courts. 3 The court further uses Board of Trustees
for the proposition that it is the legality of enforcing the award that is important and
not whether the arbitrator was correct.8 4 Therefore, the court follows W.R. Grace in
ruling that the public policy used to vacate an arbitration award must be explicit,
well defined, dominant, and found by referring to laws and precedent, not
generalizations of alleged public interests.8 5 The court then ruled that public policy




The Connecticut, Supreme Court should have deferred to the decision of the
arbitrator. In Misco, a case the court cited, the United States Supreme Court said that
the courts must defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of contract (collective






81. Id. at 401-02.
82. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 510.
83. Id. at 508.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 509.
86. Id. at 510.
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bargaining agreement) language. 7 The Court held that The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 reflected the preference for labor-management relations to
enter into private settlements.rather than go to court."8 Furthermore, the Court ruled
that if "the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision." 9 In Groton, the arbitrator decided
that a plea of nolo contendere for embezzlement from Warren without independent
investigation was not sufficient to establish just cause for Warren's termination.90
The arbitrator was interpreting the meaning of just cause within the collective
bargaining agreement established between the Town of Groton and Warren's Union.
Therefore, even if the Court believed that the arbitrator was wrong in his
interpretation, the Court should have deferred to the arbitrator's judgement under
Misco.
Whether embezzlement may or may not be contrary to public policy is not the
question. The United States Supreme Court in Eastern Associated Coal Corporation
v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17 ("UMWA") 9' decided that the
question is not whether the activity of the employee violated public policy, but
whether the reinstatement of the employee does.92 Furthermore, UMWA reaffirms
the test set out in W.R. Grace and Misco.93 In UMWA, the United States Supreme
Court upheld an arbitration award to reinstate an employee that had twice failed drug
tests and been punished by the arbitrator.94 The Court found that, even though there
could be differing opinions as to the correct remedy, there was no public policy
interest that met the W.R. Grace-Misco test.95 However, since both the company and
union agreed to arbitration, they were compelled to follow the arbitrator's
judgment.96 Following this line of thought in Groton, Warren should be reinstated
since Groton and Steelworkers agreed to arbitration within their collective
bargaining agreement. Though there could be differing opinions as to whether
Warren should be reinstated, Groton and Steelworkers should be bound by the
arbitrator's decision. Although the policy against embezzlement may be strong
enough to vacate an arbitration award, it does not matter because embezzlement was
Warren's action. What is important is whether Warren's reinstatement was against
public policy. Since Groton did not hold an independent investigation as to whether
Warren embezzled, Groton could not claim there was a public policy interest to stop
87. Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-39.
88. Misco, 484 U.S. at 37. See 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994).
89. Id. at 38.
90. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d 501, at 506.
91. 531 U.S. 57 (2000). Though this case was decided a few months after Town of Groton, the Court
used the same major cases in its decision as the Connecticut Supreme Court. Therefore, there are no new
cases cited that alter the test evaluations.
92. Id. at 62-65.
93. Id.
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embezzlement. In order to make that claim, Groton should have conducted an
independent investigation. 97
Furthermore, Justice Scalia, in his UMWA concurring opinion, suggested that
in order to vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds, the award must
conflict with positive law.98 Therefore, we should look at Connecticut's positive law
concerning the relevant issues. It may be important to protect a company from
further embezzlement. However, an employer must prove embezzlement before an
employee is terminated. The issue is whether a plea of nolo contendere constitutes
sufficient evidence that Warren in fact embezzled from Groton.
Judge Katz, in his dissent in Town of Groton,99 suggested that a plea of nolo
contendere is significantly different than a plea of guilty or a trial conviction and that
it was not sufficient evidence to allow Groton to terminate Warren.'0 Judge Katz
examined how the Connecticut Supreme Court's positive law handled nolo
contendere pleas in the past and found that they were different from pleas or trial
convictions of guilt.' O' He quoted Casalo v. Claro,0 2 which stated, "a plea of nolo
contendere is merely a declaration by the accused that he will not contest the charge,
and even though followed by a finding of guilty and the imposition of a fine or other
penalty, is not admissible, either as a verbal admission or an admission by
conduct."'0 3 Judge Katz also looked to Lawrence v. Kozlowski ' to establish that
pleas of nolo contendere should be limited to the cases where they were entered. 05
Groton's procedure in determining termination was separate from the criminal case
in which Warren pled nolo contendere to embezzlement. Since pleas of nolo
contendere are not used for proof of illegal actions within Connecticut positive law,
Warren's plea was not sufficient to establish that he embezzled. Instead, Groton
should have conducted its own investigation as to whether Warren embezzled.
The majority claimed that the dissent's argument was insufficient because
"[c]ivil actions and administrative proceedings... ordinarily do not involve the kind
of legitimate expectations of the employer that are inherent in the employment
context and that would be severely undermined by requiring the reinstatement of an
employee convicted of embezzling his employer's funds."'" If Groton was so
concerned about the embezzlement, Groton should have investigated the allegations
against Warren. Groton did not know how much Warren supposedly stole from the
town. An employer should want to know how much was taken from the company,
possibly for civil action or insurance reasons. There were good reasons for Groton
to investigate the allegations against Warren, but Groton did not. Instead, Groton
97. Another alternative would be to transfer Warren to a position where he would not handle money.
Groton set precedent in doing this by transferring Warren to the highway division during the police
investigation. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 504.
98. 531 U.S. at 67-69 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
99. Judge Katz made a similar assertion in his majority opinion in the original hearing of this case. See
Town of Groton, 747 A.2d at 1054 (Katz, Norcott & Palmer, JJ., dissenting).
100. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d 501, 512-15.
101. Id.
102. 165 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1960).
103. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 513.
104. 372 A.2d 110 (Conn. 1976).
105. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 514.
106. Id. at 511.
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relied on a plea of nolo contendere that does not prove guilt and cannot be used in
subsequent proceedings. Judge Katz observed: "[b]y relying on the private nature
of arbitration as a basis upon which to create an exception to our jurisprudence
regarding the limited use of the nolo plea, the majority, in essence, takes the first step
toward the elimination of the nolo plea."' 7  Criminal defendants plead nolo
contendere because the plea cannot be used against them in a subsequent proceeding,
either as evidence of the crime or for impeachment purposes. By rendering its
decision, the majority begins to take away the incentives for defendants to plead nolo
contendere and instead go to trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Connecticut Supreme Court evaluated the public policy exception to the
general rule of confirming arbitration awards. The point is to look at the award, not
at the employee's actions, to determine if the award was contrary to public policy.
The public policy must be well-defined, explicit, and dominant. Requiring Groton
to rehire Warren after a plea of nolo contendere in the criminal court system is not
sufficient. Pleas of nolo contendere should not be used as evidence against a person
in subsequent proceedings. Instead, if Groton had established by an independent
investigation that Warren had in fact embezzled, then matters would have been
different. The arbitrator said that he would not have ordered the rehiring of Warren
if Groton had investigated the allegations.' 8 Groton should not be rewarded for
inaction, but should be made to prove just cause for Warren's dismissal.
CHRISTINA S. LEWIS
107. Town of Groton, 757 A.2d at 515.
108. Id. at 504.
2001]
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